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GATEKEEPERS, DISCLOSURE, AND ISSUER 
CHOICE 
HILLARY A. SALE 
Disclose, disclose, disclose. Disclose or abstain, disclose or no 
registration, disclose or be subject to litigation. The securities laws and 
regulations are full of talk about disclosure that is often mandated by specific 
regulations detailing what type and amount of disclosure is necessary or 
mandated by case law making it unacceptable for company officials to tell 
part, but not all, of the story.  
Disclosure is the choice made by the Congress in 1933—a choice to force 
substantive corporate change only indirectly and thus away from direct 
substantive or merit-based securities regulation; a choice away from too 
much interference in state corporate law. Despite 70 years of such 
lawmaking, the papers on this panel address, again, whether and how the 
securities laws should address disclosure, and whether issuers should have a 
choice in the disclosure regime that regulates them.  
Disclosure by itself is not the goal of our securities regulation scheme. 
The goal is quality disclosure to inform shareholders and would-be 
shareholders. Any debate, then, about issuer choice must address how one 
measures whether the regime will evaluate the quality of the disclosures 
within it. In the United States regime, market facilitators are charged with 
measuring quality, so to speak. Those facilitators, or gatekeepers, are 
supposed to vet offerings, and their reputations are supposed to serve as the 
check on their thoroughness. Those gatekeepers, lawyers, accountants, and 
investment bankers, are, however, the people that let us down in the last 
decade. Thus, even if we put to one side the problems with the likelihood of 
success of a competitive securities regulation regime, like path-dependence, 
any such regime must still address, at least in part, gatekeepers and their role 
in interpreting information for the market. These are the issues on which I 
intend to focus. 
In an issuer choice world, issuers would choose the regime in which they 
want to register their securities.1 In theory, investors, largely institutional 
  Professor of Law and F. Arnold Daum Corporate Law Scholar—University of Iowa College 
of Law. The author wishes to thank Steve Choi and participants at the Washington University 
symposium for helpful comments. Thanks also to Joe Raetzer for research assistance. 
 1. See, e.g., Merritt Fox, Optimal Regulatin Areas for Securities Disclosure, WASH. U. L.Q. 
(forthcoming 2003); ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR 
SECURITIES REGULATION (AEI 2002); Stephen J. Choi, Promoting Issuer Choice in Securities 
Regulation, 41 VIR. J. INTL. L. 815 (2001). 
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ones, could choose not to invest in companies who select a “bad” or 
inadequate securities regime or could at least demand to pay less for the 
securities. The geographic restrictions that now exist, prohibiting, for 
example, companies selling non-U.S. registered securities from selling those 
securities in the U.S., would presumably no longer exist. But, just as any 
regime would likely adopt some form of mandatory disclosure, those other 
regimes would likely still depend on market facilitators or gatekeepers to 
review and digest information about the issuer as part of the price-setting 
mechanism.  
Under the U.S. federal system of regulation, the gatekeepers are the ones 
charged with reviewing the merits of the offering or other transaction. In an 
offering, for example, the merits review occurs mainly in the prefiling and 
waiting periods. Several gatekeepers are involved, including accountants, 
lawyers, and investment bankers. After the Enron scandal, no one doubts that 
the gatekeeper accountants failed the market.2 Although they have received 
less press, it appears that the lawyers and investment banks also failed the 
market. Enron’s lawyers at Vinson & Elkins were reportedly involved in the 
structuring of the now infamous partnership deals and were unwilling to 
listen to warnings about the “dubious nature” of those deals.3 The lawyers 
also apparently did tell in-house counsel of the fears they had about Enron 
deals, and when “rebuffed by Mr. Fastow,” they repeatedly refrained from 
speaking to other senior executives or the Board.4 The Board, however, was 
the designated client. Other law firms have also been implicated.5 The 
investment banks are subject to criticism as well. For example, one 
investment bank, Merrill Lynch, reportedly fired its analyst who angered 
Enron officers by rating the stock neutral.6 It did, however, keep the Enron 
business.7  
 2. See, e.g., Powers Report, Feb. 1, 2002 (noting that Andersen signed off on treatment of 
Chewco and LJM1 transactions led to Nov. 2001 restatement and billed Enron $5.7 million beyond 
regular audit fees for advice in connection with those transactions alone). 
 3. See Law Firm Reassured Enron on Accounting, WALL ST. J., Jan. 1, 16, 2002, at A18.  
 4. Ellen Joan Pollock, Lawyers for Enron Faulted Its Deals, Didn’t Force Issue, WALL ST. J., 
MAY 22, 2002, at A1. 
 5. See, e.g., Otis Bilodeau, Enron Probe Examines Firms’ Roles, Legal Times, Mar. 11, 2003 
(describing bankruptcy examiners’ second report on Enron and noting that reports issued by several 
law firms were problematic, including reports from Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, McKee Nelson, 
Andrews & Kurth, and Vinson and Elkins). 
 6. See Charles Gasparino & Randall Smith, Merrill Defends Ties to Enron Before Congress, 
WALL ST. J., JULY 31, 2002, at C1; Richard A. Oppell, Jr., Merrill Replaced Research Analyst Who 
Upset Enron, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2002; Randall Smith & Anita Raghavan, Congress Probes Merill-
Enron Deals, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2002, at C1. 
 7. See id. 
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What is the problem? In the 1990s, management, venture capitalists, 
lawyers, investment bankers, and accountants took companies public that 
probably would not have made the public offering cut in earlier decades. Too 
many of these market participants were focused on the short run. The 
motives of those people, greed according to Alan Greenspan, overwhelmed 
whatever gatekeeping functions they were supposed to be providing.8  
The greed manifested itself in conflicts. And, those conflicts abound. The 
lawyers had equity investments in their clients.9 So did the venture 
capitalists, the investment banks, and the analysts themselves.10 The 
accountants faced other conflict problems, including client capture due in 
part to the provision of other non-accounting services.11  
These problems are not unique to the U.S., making gatekeeping problems 
part of any issuer-choice debate. For example, in Germany, Deustche Bank is 
under investigation for reiterating a buy rating on Deutsche Telekom stock 
one day and then selling 44 million shares of that stock the following day.12 
In Great Britain, the role of analysts in U.S. investment banking and their 
conflicts of interest prompted the British Financial Services Authority to 
review the work of analysts in its banking industry.13 Although the Authority 
determined that the problems facing the U.S. were not as widespread in 
England, its report states that many more stocks there receive positive ratings 
than appears appropriate based on real values.14 The gatekeeping problem, 
then, is not confined to the U.S. market and remains an issue for any 
discussion of issuer choice. 
 8. Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan, Federal Reserve Board’s Seminannual Monetary 
Policy Report to the Congress, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
boarddocs/hh/2002/july/testimony.htm (last visited July 17, 2002). 
 9. See John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, The Decline in Lawyer Independence:  Lawyer 
Equity Investments in Clients, 81 TEX. L. REV. 406 (2002). 
 10. See Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent:  Rethinking the 
Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035 (2003) (providing background information on analyst 
and investment-banking pre-offering equity interests in companies). 
 11. See Jonathan Macey & Hillary A. Sale, Commodification, Independence, and Governance: 
Preliminary Observations on the Demise of Professionalism in the Accounting Profession, 48 VILLA. 
L. REV. 101 (forthcoming 2003). 
 12. See Sam Scott Miller, Chaperoning Analysts:  Procedure to Manage, Minimize, and Disclose 
Conflicts, 34 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 879 (June 3, 2002) (noting that German regulators were 
investigating Deutsche Bank for selling 44 million shares of Deutsche Telekom one day after publicly 
restating its “buy” rating). 
 13. See Financial Services Authority Discussion Paper 15, Investment Research:  Conflicts & 
Other Issues (July 2002) (paper on file with author) (noting that U.S. problems had to date been less 
noticeable in London, but recognizing that analyst recommendations were systematically more 
positive than justified by market performance and suggesting improved policing of analysts and 
investment banks). 
 14. See id. 
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In theory, of course, the gatekeeping issues are not overly problematic for 
issuer choice if the market discounts for them. The U.S. market apparently 
did not do so in the 1990’s. The choice to bring certain companies to market 
and to engage in creative and risky accounting maneuvers was occurring for 
years before March of 2000. The market did not, however, reject those risky 
accounting or investment bank pricing decisions. For example, Enron was 
creating Special Purpose Entities to move its debt off its balance sheets, a 
fact that was disclosed in its SEC filings.15 Yet, the market continued to 
evaluate its securities at well above the value resulting from full disclosure.16  
The choices Enron was making were very complex and, thus, arguably, 
problematic to disclose in detail.17 But the market’s failure to adjust for these 
disclosures when some, including Professor Macey have argued that the 
information was available,18 raises serious questions about whether the 
market is sufficiently informationally efficient to process information 
necessarily a part of any issuer choice debate, including information about 
which issuers choose “bad” regulatory regimes and which issuers choose the 
“good” ones.19  
Professor Macey raises these issues in his paper by asking who are the 
listeners and are they listening?20 His point is straightforward—the listeners 
are as important as the disclosers.21 He focuses, however, not on investor 
listeners, but on the intermediary listeners/gatekeepers. Those market 
facilitators are the demand side of the market equation. And the breakdown 
in their roles22 raises serious questions about the overall efficacy of our 
securities regulatory regime. It also raises questions about the efficacy of our 
mandatory disclosure system—another aspect of the U.S. regime that would 
presumably be part of any securities regime.23  
The mandatory disclosure system depends on both the disclosers and the 
listeners. Disclosers are subject to mandatory rules, largely arising from the 
 15. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity 
(working paper, Dec. 19, 2002) (discussing complications of disclosure obligations in complex 
transactions like Enron’s special purpose entities). 
 16. See, e.g., Powers Report, Feb. 1, 2002, at p. 2-3 (describing Enron’s restatements due to 
SPE’s and concomitant decline in stock and eventual bankruptcy). 
 17. See supra note 15. 
 18. Jonathan R. Macey, A Pox on Both Your Houses:  Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Debate 
Concerning the Relative Efficacy of Mandatory versus Enabling Rules, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 329 (2003). 
 19. See Rebecca Smith, The Analyst Who Warned About Enron, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2002, at 
C1 (describing one analyst who told his clients in August, 2001, that they should sell their Enron 
securities “at all costs”). 
 20. See Macey, supra note 18. 
 21. See id. 
 22. See generally Jack Coffee, It’s About the Gatekeepers Stupid, 57 BUS. LAW. 1403 (2002). 
 23. See Romano, supra note 2 at 29-30. 
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issuer disclosure provisions adopted in and pursuant to the 1933 Act. Until 
recently, the gatekeepers were, however, largely self-regulated through their 
reputations, their competitors, the market, and their own rulemaking. These 
intermediaries are “mechanisms of market efficiency” as defined in Reineer 
Kraakman and Ron Gilson’s piece by the same name.24 The design of the 
U.S. system is in part premised on the existence of intermediaries, and they 
are key to the assumptions about the functioning of an efficient market. 
Congress chose a disclosure regime that presumes mandated disclosure will 
prompt truth telling. Gatekeepers are to ensure issuer truthtelling because 
they will review and cleanse issuer information. Their reputations and the 
competition for the offering work will ensure that they do their jobs—
whether they do so as accountants signing off on audited financials or as 
investment bankers/analysts opening up the doors of capital to the issuers. 
What we now know about Enron, and many other companies, is that the 
gatekeepers did not do their jobs. 
Accordingly, any debate about whether the U.S. should reconsider its 
unilevel regime, opting instead for issuer choice, through either competitive 
federalism25 or an international system,26 must address the gatekeeping 
concerns. In 1933 Congress made a clear choice away from rewriting state 
substantive corporate law.27 Instead, it chose to prescribe a disclosure-based 
 24. Ronald Gilson & Reineer Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 
549 (1983). 
 25. See generally Romano, supra note 2 (arguing for competitive federalism); Roberta Romano, 
Empowering Investors:  A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998). 
 26. See Stephen Choi & Andrew Guzman, Portable Reciprocity:  Rethinking the Reach of U.S. 
Securities Regulation, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 983 (1998) (advocating choice of regulatory regimes for 
issuers). 
 27. The legislative history reveals that Congress intended to force substantive change, but only 
through disclosure. 
Accordingly, the registration of false information under the bill makes not only the issuer, but the 
directors who sign, civilly liable for return of the money which the purchaser paid for the security. 
 If a director can excuse himself by saying that he has in good faith relied upon an accountant's 
statement, or the statement of some other person, then the investor will continue in the same 
position for which the Nation is struggling to extricate him.  It has been stated in prospectuses 
repeatedly that the information given is believed by the company to be true, but not guaranteed. 
But it is the issuer who is in position to learn the facts, not the public. 
 This phase of the law will have a direct tendency to preclude persons from acting as nominal 
directors while shirking their duty to know and guide the affairs of the corporation.  Upon the 
discharge of this duty the public and stockholders rely in good faith.  We cannot but believe that 
many recent disastrous events in the investment world would not have taken place if those whose 
names have appeared as directors had known themselves to be under a legal, as well as a moral 
responsibility to the investing public. 
Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, S. Rep. No. 73-47 (1933), reprinted in 2 J. S. Ellenberger & 
Ellen P. Mahar, 2 Legislative History, Securities Act 1933, at 5 (1973). 
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system of federal securities law that applies only to certain companies.28 
Once subject to the SEC’s jurisdiction, these companies must comply with its 
disclosure-based regulations. The gatekeepers were supposed to make the 
merits cut, so to speak, and the statute created duties, subject to liability, to 
ensure substantive merits review. For example, the accountants are supposed 
to review the numbers and some percentage of the underlying contracts and 
other documents to ensure that management-provided numbers are accurate. 
The investment bankers are supposed to perform their own form of due 
diligence. And, despite the lack of specific statutory liability, the lawyers are 
supposed to do the same. With all of these gatekeepers, firms like Enron 
should not have been able to hide the truth from the market for so long. But, 
they did. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“Sarbanes-Oxley”) is Congress’s attempt to 
address the gatekeeping concerns. And, interestingly, it does so not by 
keeping the federal government out of state substantive law or allowing the 
states to take larger roles or create their own securities regulatory systems to 
compete with the federal regime, but by shifting the debate to one about how 
much larger the federal government’s role in substantive corporate regulation 
should be. As a result, Sarbanes-Oxley makes it clear that Congress believes 
that investors want more than just mandatory disclosure, and right now, more 
is not issuer choice. Congress decided that what investors, or at least voters, 
want is direct federal regulation of corporate policy and governance. 
Delaware has been sidelined—at least for the time being.29 Congress has 
jumped in with some very strong provisions, though, of course, only time 
will judge their efficacy.  
Professor Macey refers to these provisions as facilitating the market 
through contract enhancement.30 The provisions address many of the 
gatekeepers’ roles. Some call for direct federal intervention in corporate 
governance—the exact position that Congress declined to take in 1933.31 For 
example, Sarbanes-Oxley creates an entirely new structure for regulating 
accountants, eliminating the form of self-regulation that existed in the past 
and creating new corporate governance structures, like specific audit 
 28. Companies subject to federal securities regulation have either securities listed on a national 
securities exchange or $1 million in assets and 500 security holders. 
 29. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, (working paper on file with author) (arguing that 
age-old arguments about race to the top or bottom are misconceived because Delaware’s main 
competition is with federal government). 
 30. See Macey, supra note 18. 
 31. See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Law as Corporate Governance:  
Reflections Upon Federalism, 54 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003) (describing focus of securities 
laws on disclosure and substance only through disclosure). 
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committee powers, to address management/auditor capture issues.32 These 
provisions directly regulate a formerly self-regulated gatekeeping group.  
Sarbanes-Oxley also regulates lawyers, another one of the gatekeeping 
groups that seems to have fallen down on the job. There remains room for 
considerable discussion about how and whether we did our jobs well, but 
whatever the outcome of that discussion, Sarbanes-Oxley creates, as a matter 
of federal law, mandatory whistleblowing obligations for us. The 
whistleblowing provision addresses what the lawyers refused to do 
themselves—it creates obligations to report on the lawyer’s clients. The 
provision also arguably forces a duty of care on partners who, due to the rise 
in the LLP structure and concomitant elimination of vicarious liability, 
arguably lack the incentive to monitor their peers early or well enough to 
catch client/capture problems.33  
In part, these reforms also address the increasing dominance of corporate 
officers in today’s large and complex companies34 and regulate corporate 
governance directly, rather than relying on disclosure mechanisms to do so 
indirectly. For example, Sarbanes-Oxley creates specific roles for audit 
committees and provisions for whistleblowers and legal counsel and attempts 
to decrease the conflicts between auditing and other services from auditors. 
In making these changes, Sarbanes-Oxley strengthens the duties of boards of 
directors over officers, directly regulates corporate governance, and further 
enlarges the federal securities regime.  
The Act, however, largely ignores one key set of gatekeepers-–investment 
bankers. Although the investment-banking problems may be harder to 
address as corporate governance problems, for the most part, Sarbanes-Oxley 
simply does not address them. To be sure, Section 501 prescribes increased 
regulation of analysts, but the regulations need not come through the SEC. 
Sarbanes-Oxley leaves the self-regulatory organizations potentially in charge. 
Those organizations have shown themselves to be unwilling to self-regulate 
or enforce their regulations. Yet, somehow, unlike the accountants who are 
now going to be governed by the accounting board, and unlike the lawyers, 
who neglected to impose ethical limitations on themselves and will now face 
federal ethical limitations, the investment banks have managed to escape the 
expanded securities law regime. 
 32. See Macey, supra note 18; see also Macey & Sale, supra note 11; see also Jonathan Weil, 
Enron’s Auditors Debated Partnership Losses, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 2002, at C1 (describing how 
accountants at Andersen knew of growing losses but “continued to bend” to Enron executive wishes 
not to make those losses public). 
 33. See Macey & Sale, supra note 11 (discussing rise of LLP structure and deterioration of 
partnership incentives to monitor peers). 
 34. See Greenspan, supra note 8. 
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The investment banks, however, are as much at fault as the other players 
and have done little to monitor their own conflicts of interest. New York 
Attorney General Elliot Spitzer’s investigations have exposed in detail what 
the media was reporting for over a decade,35 and what, presumably, the 
markets ignored. Sell-side analysts were saying anything publicly to hype 
their employers’ companies.36 Privately they were saying the opposite and 
trading accordingly.37 To be sure, the SRO rules prohibited such stock 
transactions absent disclosure.38 But, the banks did not bother to keep track 
of stock ownership, let alone enforce the disclosure rules.39 Instead, they and 
their clients pressured their employees to give positive reports, rather than to 
tell the truth.40 
And, importantly, the investment bank problem goes well beyond analyst 
conflicts so heavily discussed in the media and referred to in Sarbanes-Oxley. 
For example, banks have refused research coverage to clients who refuse to 
hire the bank for an offering, making clients who want coverage captive.41 
The banks have also “sold” their due diligence obligations for other business, 
resulting in faulty and incomplete disclosures. Consider the role of Salomon 
Smith Barney (“Salomon”) in Adelphia’s offerings. Salomon reportedly led 
Adelphia’s $1.5 billion stock offering and co-managed another $1 billion 
stock sale. At the same time, Salomon’s parent, Citigroup had serviced $3.1 
billion in loans to a partnership owned by the Rigas family, then in control of 
Adelphia and now under criminal investigation.42 Adelphia was co-borrower 
on those loans.43 Despite the Salomon/Citigroup connection, the loans were 
not disclosed.44 Moreover, the red flags in the Adelphia financials were 
apparently sufficient enough that properly conducted due diligence would 
 35. See, e.g., Michael Siconolfi, Under Pressure:  At Morgan Stanley, Analysts Were Urged to 
Soften Harsh Views, WALL ST. J., July 14, 1992, at A1 (describing analyst told by investment-banking 
counterparts to revise views and reminded that her salary depended on her ability to “attract” 
investment-banking clients). 
 36. See Fisch & Sale, supra note 10 (describing in detail sell-side analyst conflicts and influence 
on ratings and investment-banking decisions).  
 37. See id. 
 38. See id. 
 39. See id. 
 40. See id.; see, e.g., Michael Schroeder & Randall Smith, CSFB Analysts Felt Pressured on 
Stock Reports, WALL ST. J., September 6, 2002, at C1  (describing examples of research analysts who 
felt pressured by their firm not to issue negative reports on clients). 
 41. See, e.g., Randall Smith & Geeta Anand, Piper Jaffray is Fined for Research Threat, WALL 
ST. J., June 26, 2002, at C1. 
 42. Deborah Solomon, Salomon Draws Focus Over Work for Adelphia, WALL ST. J., June 5, 
2002, at C1. 
 43. See id. 
 44. See id. 
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have raised the question and turned up the answer.45 Instead, the result was 
incomplete due diligence and questions about conflicts. 
Citigroup’s maneuver to use its lending capacity as leverage to “secure 
other, more lucrative securities” underwriting business with Adelphia is 
apparently not uncommon.46 Several banks were criticized for similar 
concerns involving Enron.47 Indeed, the investment banks involved with 
Enron reportedly wore a “number of conflicting hats.”48 The District Court 
analyzing the Enron complaint found that the plaintiffs had pleaded facts 
with sufficient particularity against several banks, denying the motions to 
dismiss of JP Morgan, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, CIBC, Barclay’s, and Merrill 
Lynch.  
Although they were similar, the allegations against each bank had unique 
twists.49 For example, in addition to underwriting securities and providing 
positive research on Enron, approximately 100 Merrill Lynch executives 
were reported to have invested more than $16 million of their own funds in 
the LJM2 Co-Investment LP. That entity was one of the now infamous and 
largest off-balance sheet special entities.50  
Then, there are the two investment bankers at Credit Suisse First Boston 
that apparently helped design some off-balance sheet entities while serving as 
directors of those same entities.51 The entities, of course, allowed Enron to 
keep the appearance of its debt level low and, accordingly, maintain investor 
interest in its stock and its credit rating.52 JP Morgan allegedly disguised 
approximately $5 billion in loans, made just before the end of a quarter, as 
commodity trades.53  
The Enron court also refused to dismiss allegations claiming that 
Citigroup, Credit Suisse, and CIBC were involved in providing money as 
“investors” that helped to enable the New Power IPO.54 In return, the banks 
received a “total return swap” guarantee against any loss to be sustained by 
New Power.55 The court also found allegations that Barclay’s undisclosed 
 45. See id. 
 46. See id. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See Charles Gasparino & Tom Hamburger, Congress Broadens Probe of Enron Fall and 
Wall Street Role, Mar. 7, 2002, WALL ST. J., at C1. 
 49. See In re Enron Corp., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 638-656 (S.D. Tex 2002). 
 50. See Gasparino and Hamburger, supra note 48, at C15; see also Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 
696-99. 
 51. See Charles Gasparino & Randall Smith, CSFB Bankers Served as Directors of Enron Entity, 
WALL ST. J., June 5, 2002, at C1. 
 52. See id. 
 53. See Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 695-96. 
 54. See id. at 698. 
 
 55. See id. 
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demand of repayment of its investments in off-balance entities provided 
sufficient evidence of scienter at the motion to dismiss stage.56 These alleged 
conflicts go well beyond the analyst conflicts that have received so much 
press and regulatory attention. Yet, they are not addressed by Sarbanes-
Oxley. 
And, that is not the end of the story. There is still the spinning problem. 
Although under investigation right now, spinning, the practice of providing 
shares of hot IPOs to CEOs, CFOs, and others in order to gain their 
companies’ investment banking business, has existed for a long time.57 
Banks have used spinning in combination with laddering, requiring spinnees 
to buy more shares in the aftermarket, not only to snare business, but also to 
help meet aftermarket stabilization goals.58 Laddering is clearly illegal, but 
few doubt that it occurred during the 1990s.59 Everyone comes out ahead 
except those who cannot access the IPO and buy only at the inflated 
aftermarket price.60  
And, finally, there are the loans made by the investment banks to their 
clients that have been illegally recognized as revenues. For example, Merrill 
Lynch has agreed to pay $80 million to settle allegations that it assisted 
Enron in improper revenue recognition.61 Allegedly, Merrill Lynch was 
involved in helping Enron close two transactions that allowed Enron to 
recognize revenue from the sale of the entities.62 As a result, Enron was able 
to meet analysts’ revenue projections for the quarter in question.63 Although 
the transactions involved Merrill purchasing assets from Enron, it promptly 
resold them to Enron in the next year.64 Thus, the transactions at issue were 
really loans, not properly recognized as revenue. As discussed above, the 
District Court opinion in the Enron securities-fraud, class-action litigation 
indicates that Merrill Lynch was not alone in its problematic banking 
behavior. And, importantly, these problems have nothing to do with the 
analyst issues that have gained media and Congressional attention. 
 56. See id. at 703. 
 57. See Randall Smith & Susan Pulliam, How a Star Banker Pressed for IPOs, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 5, 2002, at C1; see also Therese Maynard, Spinning in a Hot IPO—Breach Of Fiduciary Duty or 
Business As Usual?, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2023 (2002). 
 58. See Randall Smith, IPO ‘Laddering’ Case Expands, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2003, at C1. 
 59. See id. 
 60. See id. 
 61. See Randall Smith, Merrill to Settle with SEC Over Enron-Related Matter, WALL ST. J., Feb. 
21, 2003, at C1. 
 62. See id. 
 63. See id. at C11. 
 64. See id. at C1. 
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The banks have been pressured to settle and reform their practices with 
respect to analysts, in large measure due to Attorney General Elliot Spitzer’s 
wide-ranging investigations.65 But, the amount the banks have agreed to pay 
to settle those investigations is paltry relative to their earnings during the IPO 
heyday.66 Merrill Lynch paid $100 million to settle the possible charges 
against it. The other banks have joined forces for a joint settlement that will 
total $1.4 billion, including $900 million in penalties and $535 million for 
independent research and investor education.67  
By way of comparison, Wall Street research budgets reportedly peaked at 
double the settlement amount in 2000.68 The pretax profits of the securities 
industry in the late 1990s are estimated to have been $16.3 billion in 1999 
and $21 billion in 2000.69 The number for 2001 was estimated to be $10.4 
billion. And, most of the settlement will be tax deductible, with only about 
$450 million falling in the non-deductible fine or penalty categories.70 Add to 
the tax benefits the fact that much of the settlement cost is likely to be 
covered by insurance payments, and the result in terms of pain is arguably 
“trivial.”71  
Despite all of these problems and the settlements, the investment banks 
are still primarily self-regulated. Of course, if the investment bankers fail to 
do due diligence, they can be sued. But the courts and Congress have created 
significant barriers to the original causes of action, leaving litigation of those 
claims a diminished enforcement vehicle.72 As a result, self-policing remains 
 65. See Fisch & Sale, supra note 36 (describing Spitzer’s Merrill Lynch investigation and 
resulting settlement).  At the time this Article went to press, the banks were reportedly settling SEC 
allegations related the shareholder claims in Enron.  Although the banks did not admit “wrongdoing,” 
Citigroup, Inc. and J.P. Morgan agreed to pay $305 million and indicated that they had changed their 
procedures and had adopted some changes designed to increase their responsibility for the accuracy of 
issuer disclosures.  Mitchell Pacelle & Laurie P. Cohen, J.P. Morgan, Citigroup Will Pay $305 Million 
to Settle Enron Case, WALL ST. J., July 29, 2003, at A1.  In addition, Stephen J. Cutler, head of the 
SEC’s enforcement office, stated that the banks were paying the money and make the changes after 
“’helping to commit a fraud’ on Enron’s shareholders.  Id.  Of course, whether the proposed changes 
will result in improved gatekeeping remains to be seen.  See id. at A2. 
 66. See, e.g., Randall Smith and John Hechinger, Former Unit of FleetBoston Receives Fines, 
WALL ST. J., Jun. 10, 2003, at C1 (noting that FleetBoston agreed to pay various fines for IPO 
problems but that only $5 million of total settlement was attributed to allegedly fraudulent stock 
research lacking conflict of interest disclosures). 
 67. See id. 
 68. See Randall Smith & Charles Gasparino, Analyst Inquiry May Cost Wall Street $2 Billion, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2002, at C1. 
 69. See id. 
 70. See Gregory Zuckerman, Wall Street’s Settlement Will Be Less Taxing, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 
2003, at C1. 
 71. See id. (quoting Samuel Hayes, professor at Harvard Business School). 
 72. See Hillary A. Sale, Disappearing Without a Trace:  Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 1933 
Securities Act, 75 WASH. L. REV. 429 (2000) (describing evolution of common law tracing doctrine 
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the primary vehicle for addressing concerns. The self-regulatory 
organizations, however, have been vilified for their failure to do much, if 
any, self-policing.73 In the Enron fallout, the organizations have promulgated 
new rules, again largely focused on analyst issues, but whether they will be 
better at enforcing them remains to be seen.74 The SEC has approved several 
new regulations proposed by the SROs, but the rules actually do little to 
eliminate the conflicts that caused the problems.75 Instead, the rules and the 
substantive aspects of the settlements focus largely on disclosure and, mostly, 
analysts. Whether the disclosure remedy offers much is open to question. 
After all, if disclosure worked, the newspaper reports going back to the early 
1990’s should have taken care of the problem. And, of course, the SEC, 
which has the power to enforce the SRO rules, has declined to do so in the 
past. 
Congress sidestepped. Having ducked the accountant issue in the past, 
last year Congress stepped up to prescribe direct regulation of accountants.76 
However, its response to the Enron crisis with respect to analysts was 
minimal and nonexistent on the other investment banking conflicts detailed 
above. Given the other substantive changes in Sarbanes-Oxley, the absence 
of prescriptions for these key market gatekeepers is noticeable.  
Why? First, the investment banks have made it clear that they do not want 
any further regulation, pushing hard to stop any further investigations like 
those of A.G. Spitzer who has benefited from a unique state law. The banks 
have stated that they want no more power for state securities regulators post-
Enron and post-Spitzer.77 This position is not new.78 After all, one system is 
easier to master and dominate.79 Indeed, path dependence poses problems for 
any change in regimes.  
and its impact on motions to dismiss); Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and Discovery Stays:  An 
Analysis of the Effect of the PSLRA’s Internal-Information Standard on ’33 and ’34 Act Claims, 76 
WASH. U. L.Q. 537, 583-86 (1998) (detailing evolution of sounds-in-fraud doctrine as applied to strict-
liability and negligence-like claims at motion to dismiss stage). 
 73. See, e.g., Randall Smith & Susan Pulliam, How a Star Banker Pressed for IPOs, WALL ST. 
J., Sept. 5, 2002, at C1 (reporting SRO investigation, with no cases ever brought, of spinning in 1997). 
 74. See, e.g. Fisch & Sale, supra note 36 (discussing new rules on analysts). 
 75. See id. 
 76. Michael Schroeder & Greg Hitt, Congress Fought Changes to Accounting Rules Over Past 
Decade, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2002, at A20 (reporting that Congress should “shoulder some of the 
blame” for the Enron mess, because of its repeated refusal to respond to attempts by SEC and others to 
improve accounting regulation). 
 77. See Charles Gasparino, Morgan Stanley Goes to Washington, WALL ST. J., June 21, 2002, at 
C1. 
 78. See Romano, supra note 1. 
 79. See id. 
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And, ties between the securities industry and members of Congress are 
extensive. Members of Congress have benefited from investment bank 
largesse. Some members benefited from spinning, receiving IPO shares at the 
offering price that they were allowed to flip in the market at easy profits.80 
Indeed, although the settlement addressing analyst issues prohibits spinning, 
it prohibits spinning only to issuer clients, not to members of Congress or 
others.  
Investment banks are also a “powerful lobbying force.”81 In 2000, the 
year of the market crash, securities and investment firms gave $91.7 million 
to candidates and parties.82 After law firms and retired individuals, they were 
the third highest givers.83 And, the Washington Post recently reported that six 
sources, “both Republicans and Democrats” said that members of 
Representative Oxley’s staff had “suggested that a congressional probe [of 
the mutual fund industry] might ease up if the trade group complie[d] with 
their wishes” 84 to hire a republican lobbyist rather than the democrat the 
industry has long used.85 No decision has been made about whether an ethics 
probe into Representative Oxley should be commenced, but the matter 
remains under consideration.86 Whether there is a correlation between the 
gifts and the ties and the lack of attention given to these problems in 
Sarbanes-Oxley is a subject for another paper; the reality is a lack of effective 
federal regulation and enforcement, whatever the cause. 
In conclusion, it appears that Enron and other corporate crises have 
sidelined the debate about issuer choice—at least for now. Instead, in 
Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress passed a set of serious reforms to the federal 
securities laws. Those reforms increase the role of the federal government in 
securities regulation and take the first direct steps toward federal regulation 
of corporate governance. The legislation does not, however, address at least 
one key group of the gatekeeping regime, investment banks, on which any 
system of securities governance would depend.  
The political clout of the bankers poses a serious hurdle to any system of 
issuer choice. To date, the bankers have indicated that they prefer to keep the 
 80. See Christine B. Whelen & Tom Hamburger, IPO Largess Flowed to Capitol Hill, WALL ST. 
J., Jul. 6, 2002, at A4 (Sept. 6, 2002) (listing members of Congress who benefited from investment 
bank largesse through IPOs in 1990s). 
 81. See Commentary:  Grill Wall Street’s Kingpins Next, BUS. WK., Mar. 25, 2002, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com:/print/magazine/content/02_12b3775007.htm?mz. 
 82. See id. 
 83. See id. 
 84. See The Ethics Committee’s Job, Editorial, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2003, at A22. 
 85. See Jim VandeHei & Kathleen Day, Oxley May Face Ethics Probe, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 
2003, at A4. 
 86. See id. 
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federal regime unified—not to have a double regime. Whether they would 
support a world in which they can choose between the federal government 
and a particular state regulator remains to be seen, but their effectiveness 
with Congress may well indicate that there is no reason for them to want a 
change. Why lobby fifty states when one Congress is all it takes?  
Finally, and, perhaps most importantly, unless the problems with the 
gatekeeping mechanisms are thoroughly addressed, issuer choice should 
properly remain off the table. Before we can resolve whether issuer choice is 
preferable to a unified federal regime, we have to address whether the 
gatekeepers are doing their jobs—both here and abroad. Without them, the 
market mechanism on which the theory of issuer choice relies, at least in 
part, is insufficient to convey to investors accurate information about the 
choice of regulatory regime and what it might reflect about the issuer in 
question. To date, at least with respect to investment banking, Congress has 
chosen not to address at least one of the key facilitators, the investment 
banks. And, given the infrequency with which Congress makes securities law 
changes, new legislation making such changes appears unlikely.  
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